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CONTRACT - DECEIT - AcCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD
PARTIE.-Plaintiff granted a loan to a factor in reliance upon a cer-

tified" balance sheet prepared by defendant, a firm of accountants. It
was contended that defendant, though aware that the balance sheet
would be used to obtain credit, failed (1) to verify fictitious accounts
fraudulently inserted by the factor and (2) to point out the stagnant
condition of, and the inadequate reserves for other accounts. It was
further claimed that thirty days later-after the loan had been made
-- defendant sent an accurate description of the latter condition to the
factor but no attempt was made to notify creditors. Plaintiff brought
an action for deceit against defendant for misrepresentation as to the
solvency of the factor. The Appellate Division affirmed a decision of
the trial court which set aside a verdict for plaintiff. Upon appeal,
held, reversed and new trial granted. A prima facie case in deceit
was established by evidence of gross negligence from which the jury
in the instant case would be authorized to infer fraud. State Street
Trust Co. v. Ernst,278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. (2d) 416 (1938).
Most of the early actions for deceit, like their modem counterparts, were brought when plaintiff was misled into some business venture by defendant's misrepresentation.' Since early common law the
elements of the action have remained substantially the same: 2 a false
statement of a material fact, 3 knowingly 4 made, which is intended to 5
and does induce the deceived to act to his detriment.6 Accountants
herself to the direction and control of the defendant for the treatment and cure
of certain disease, stated a cause of action, not only for the installment due at
the time of the testator's death, but also for entire damages for breach of the
contract. The decision can be justified on the ground that since the contract
was bilateral, the defendant's anticipatory breach gave the plaintiff an immediate
action for entire damages; cf. Werner v. Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154 N. Y.
Supp. 570 (1st Dept. 1915), where the court held that the non-payment of an
installment and repudiation by defendant under a unilateral contract, did not
entitle plaintiff to sue for damages for breach of the contract, but only to sue
for each installment as it fell due. Compare Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe,
12 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), noted with approval in 36- YALE L. J. 263
(where a recovery on an insurance policy which provided for specified weekly
payments, was allowed to include all installments, including those not due, on
the theory that the contract was not unilateral, but bilateral, since the insured
was required to furnish physician's report of her condition every thirty days)
with Kevan v. John Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 719 (W. D. Mo. 193?).
'Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42
HARV. L. REv. 733.
2 EDGAR AND EDGAR, TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 178-187.
'Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. Leach, 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 700 (1928);
Moore v. Abbey, 213 App. Div. 787, 210 N. Y. Supp. 766 (4th Dept. 1925).
'Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919); Rose v. Goodale, 169
N. Y. Supp. 446 (1918).
'Habeeb v. Dass, 111 Misc. 437, 181 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1920), aff'd, 196
App. Div. 974, 188 N. Y. Supp. 925 (2d Dept. 1921).
'Laska v. Harris, 215 N. Y. 554, 109 N. E. 599 (1915) (defendant's deceit
need not be the sole inducing cause) ; Mahon v. Equitable Trust Co., 181 App.
Div. 335, 168 N. Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dept. 1918); EDGAR AND EDGAR, 10c. cit.
supra note 2.
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are no exception to liability for deceit when all the elements are
proved.7 Where, however, as in the case at bar, an accountant makes
negligent misrepresentations two questions arise: (1) To whom is he
liable on the theory of negligence? and (2) Can negligence be equivalent to deceit?
In general, liability for negligent misrepresentation tends to be
restricted to cases where there is a contractual relationship.8 But
assaults have been made on this "citadel of privity". 9 In Glanzer v.
Shepard,'0 defendant was liable to the third party when he knew that
reaching the plaintiff was the sole purpose of the transaction. And
in Doyle v. Chatharn & Phenix National Bank,"1 a recovery was allowed where the third party, though not known to defendant, as above,
was a member of a definitely ascertainable class of people who would
O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Ultramares v.
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); Tindle v. Birkett, 171 N. Y.
520, 64 N. E. 210 (1902) (defendant owed a duty to creditors and investors to
make the balance sheet they prepared for their employer without fraud when
from the circumstances they could tell the employer didn't intend to keep it to
himself).
8 Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); Craig v.
Angon, 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dept. 1925), aff'd, 242
N. Y. 569, 152 N. E. 431 (1926); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl.
783 (1919); Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 858. In the absence of statute, in
cases involving: attorneys in instances other than where they have prepared
abstracts, good inspectors, tax collectors, notaries, public accountants, and banks,
responsibility for statements negligently made has been restricted to instances
of contractual relationship.
' MacPherson v. Buick Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) (a manufacturer owes a duty of care to anyote likely to be harmed by a defective
article which is dangerous to life or limb if not properly made. Originally this
case was limited to dangerous instrumentalities. By analogy to this case, it is
submitted that an accountant's statement might be considered a dangerous
instrumentality) ; Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918) (in
which the Court of Appeals explains the four situations in which a third party

beneficiary may maintain an action);

WHITNEY, CONTRACTS

(3d ed. 1937) 200-

208; Cardozo, C. J., in Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 180, 174 N. E.
441 (1931): "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these
days apace". Nichols v. Clark, MacMullen & Riley, Inc., 261 N. Y. 118,
184 N. E. 729 (1938) ; Notes (1938) 12 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 281; (1937) 37
COL. L. Rv. 126.
233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922) (a seller of beans hired defendant
public weigher, to weigh the beans. In reliance upon the certificate of weight
the buyer paid the seller. The certificate was erroneous and defendant was
liable to the buyer for negligence though privity was lacking. Defendant knew
his certificate was solely for the purpose of the buyer; and then again, defendant was engaged in a public calling, i.e., public weigher. Where an accountant
knew that reaching a certain third person was the end and aim of the transaction the court would probably extend liability under the reasoning of this case;
but the court would not consider the accountant as engaged in a public calling,
it is public only in that the accountant offers his services to the public.
"253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930) (a trustee under a deed of trust to
secure an issue of bonds, certified them falsely and was liable to a subscriber
of the bond because the certification was made for the very purpose of influencing the conduct of such subscribers) ; Note (1930) 5 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 76.
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ordinarily rely upon the statements. But in Ultramaresv. Touche,'1 2
although defendant accountants knew "prospective creditors" were
likely to rely upon the balance sheet, the Court of Appeals refused
to hold defendant liable on the theory of negligence because of the
absence of privity.'3 However, though defendant was not held liable
on the theory of negligence, the court held that the facts might lead
to an inference of fraud by the jury, and ordered a new trial for a
determination of these facts. 14
But intent is an essential element of deceit, while in negligence
intent plays no part. Therefore, negligence can not be equivalent to
deceit.15 But, in Ultramaresv. Touche 16 and in the instant case, by
holding that acts or omissions which are heedless and reckless may be
evidence from which fraud may be inferred, the court attempts to
bridge this gap between intentional wrongdoing and negligent misconduct; gross negligence is thus taking the place of intent.17 As to mere
negligence, i.e., honest blunder as distinguished from heedlessness and
recklessness, no fraud can be inferred, and recovery can be had only
on the theory of negligence if there is privity.
It is only fitting that accountants should be held to a high degree
of care.' 8 They know the faith and credit placed upon their work
-255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931) (defendant accountants prepared a
balance sheet they knew would be used for credit purposes, but failed to verify
$700,000 of accounts fraudulently inserted in the books by their employer).
This is the leading New York case on accountants' liability to third parties.
Id. at 179, "* * * otherwise accountants may be liable in an indeterminate
amount, for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Cf. Doyle v.
Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930). It is
difficult to see why "prospective creditors" are not members of the "reasonably
ascertainable class" that the subscribers were in the Doyle case, supra note 11.
' See infra note 17.
'Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919); Habeeb v. Dass,
111 Misc. 437, 181 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1920), aff'd, 196 App. Div. 974, 188 N. Y.
Supp. 925 (2d Dept. 1921) ; EDGAR AND EDGAR, TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 202.
"255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
' T Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); Derry v.
Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, H. L. (1889).
In the instant case the court described the negligent conduct which would
take the place of deliberate intent as follows:
(1) A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accountant
when knowledge there is none.
(2) A reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as
to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief in its truth.
(3) A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful if
sufficiently gross.

(4) Heedless and reckless disregard of consequence.
In the light of this description the question of whether fraud could be
inferred in the instant case was properly left to the jury.
" THE SECURITIEs ACT OF 1933, as amended (48 STAT. 74 [1933], 15 U. S.
C. §77a [1934]) has considerably extended liability of accountants to third
party investors, for innocent but negligent misrepresentation, and fraud, in
connection with auditing books and furnishing statements used in furthering the
sale of securities. "77k(a) : In case any part of the registration statement
* * * contained an untrue statement of a material fact required to be stated
therein, * * * any person acqwiring such security * * * may either at law or
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and the group of people who would ordinarily rely upon it.19 The
law in New York as developed from the Ultranmres case and the instant case may be summarized as follows:
1. In the absence of privity an accountant is not liable to third
persons for honest blunder, on the theory of negligence, because he
owes no duty of care.20
2. In the absence of privity an accountant is not liable to third
persons for gross negligence on the theory of negligence, because he
owes no duty of care. 21 But he is liable to third persons on the theory
for gross negligence, because from this a jury may infer
of deceit
22
fraud.
to fraud
3. Negligence, no matter how gross, is never equivalent
23
as a matter of law; it always remains a question of fact.
R. A. K.

COURTS-PROVINCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS---QUESTIONS OF GENERAL LAW - VALIDITY OF DOCTRINE OF SWIFT V.

TysoN.-Plaintiff sues to recover for personal injuries allegedly sus-

equity * * * sue * * * (4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any
person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him who has
with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement. * * * " (Italics ours.) This is, of course, subject to
certain enumerated defenses for wfiich see the Securities Act. However, under
the present law, the Securities Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C.
§ 78a (1934) 78r, the defendant may escape liability for a false or misleading
statement if he proves that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading.

"In

REED, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF PUBLIc ACCOUNTANTS

(1935), an excellent book on the whole subject of liability of public accountants,
the author suggests: (1) If liability for mere negligence is to be extended it
should be limited to those persons the accountant knows will use his statements
for business transactions with his client. (2) That it would seem more just
for the courts to require a different degree of care to third parties where the
accountant's services are gratuitous. And (3) in the event of an extension of
liability, the defense of contributory negligence should still be available against
the third party. It is submitted that where an accountant knows that the
balance sheet he prepared will be used for credit purposes, and after he has
sent it to his employer he discovers that the condition of the items is not as
represented, he owes a duty not only to notify promptly his employer, but to
take reasonable steps to find out and notify every person who received a copy.
"' See cases cited supra notes 7, 8 and 9.
2 Ibid.
2Ibid.

mIbid.

